Paper Presentation & Seminar Topics: Securing User-Controlled Routing Infrastructures

Securing User-Controlled Routing Infrastructures

Designing infrastructures that give untrusted third parties (such as end-hosts) control over routing is a promising research direction for achieving flexible and efficient communication. However, serious concerns remain over the deployment of such infrastructures, particularly the new security vulnerabilities they introduce. The flexible control plane of these infrastructures can be exploited to launch many types of powerful attacks with little effort. In this paper, we make several contributions towards studying security issues in forwarding infrastructures (FIs). We present a general model for an FI, analyze potential security vulnerabilities, and present techniques to address these vulnerabilities. The main technique that we introduce in this paper is the use of simple lightweight cryptographic constraints on forwarding entries. We show that it is possible to prevent a large class of attacks on end-hosts and bound the flooding attacks that can be launched on the infrastructure nodes to a small constant value. Our mechanisms are general and apply to a variety of earlier proposals such as , Data Router, and Network Pointers.

Existing System:-
• Cryptographic constraints are not that much strong to avoid the vulnerability to alleviate attacks.

Proposed System:-

• Lightweight cryptographic constraints on forwarding entries, allows the construction of only acyclic topologies thus preventing malicious hosts from using packet replication of the infrastructure to multiply flooding attacks.

Hardware Specification:

• Processor : Pentium Iv 2.6 Ghz
• Ram : 512 Mb Dd Ram
• Monitor : 15” Color
• Hard Disk : 20 Gb

Software Specification:

• Front End : Java, Swing
• Tools Used : JBuilder
• Operating System : WindowsXP